patch-hosts_access_5 6.6 KB

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  1. --- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/hosts_access.5 1995-01-30 19:51:47.000000000 +0100
  2. +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.5 2009-06-05 18:45:03.000000000 +0200
  3. @@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ name, host name/address) patterns. Exam
  4. impatient reader is encouraged to skip to the EXAMPLES section for a
  5. quick introduction.
  6. .PP
  7. -An extended version of the access control language is described in the
  8. -\fIhosts_options\fR(5) document. The extensions are turned on at
  9. -program build time by building with -DPROCESS_OPTIONS.
  10. +The extended version of the access control language is described in the
  11. +\fIhosts_options\fR(5) document. \fBNote that this language supersedes
  12. +the meaning of \fIshell_command\fB as documented below.\fR
  13. .PP
  14. In the following text, \fIdaemon\fR is the the process name of a
  15. network daemon process, and \fIclient\fR is the name and/or address of
  16. @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ A newline character is ignored when it i
  17. character. This permits you to break up long lines so that they are
  18. easier to edit.
  19. .IP \(bu
  20. -Blank lines or lines that begin with a `#\' character are ignored.
  21. +Blank lines or lines that begin with a `#' character are ignored.
  22. This permits you to insert comments and whitespace so that the tables
  23. are easier to read.
  24. .IP \(bu
  25. @@ -69,26 +69,33 @@ checks are case insensitive.
  26. .SH PATTERNS
  27. The access control language implements the following patterns:
  28. .IP \(bu
  29. -A string that begins with a `.\' character. A host name is matched if
  30. +A string that begins with a `.' character. A host name is matched if
  31. the last components of its name match the specified pattern. For
  32. -example, the pattern `.tue.nl\' matches the host name
  33. -`wzv.win.tue.nl\'.
  34. +example, the pattern `.tue.nl' matches the host name
  35. +`wzv.win.tue.nl'.
  36. .IP \(bu
  37. -A string that ends with a `.\' character. A host address is matched if
  38. +A string that ends with a `.' character. A host address is matched if
  39. its first numeric fields match the given string. For example, the
  40. -pattern `131.155.\' matches the address of (almost) every host on the
  41. +pattern `131.155.' matches the address of (almost) every host on the
  42. Eind\%hoven University network (131.155.x.x).
  43. .IP \(bu
  44. -A string that begins with an `@\' character is treated as an NIS
  45. +A string that begins with an `@' character is treated as an NIS
  46. (formerly YP) netgroup name. A host name is matched if it is a host
  47. member of the specified netgroup. Netgroup matches are not supported
  48. for daemon process names or for client user names.
  49. .IP \(bu
  50. -An expression of the form `n.n.n.n/m.m.m.m\' is interpreted as a
  51. -`net/mask\' pair. A host address is matched if `net\' is equal to the
  52. -bitwise AND of the address and the `mask\'. For example, the net/mask
  53. -pattern `131.155.72.0/255.255.254.0\' matches every address in the
  54. -range `131.155.72.0\' through `131.155.73.255\'.
  55. +An expression of the form `n.n.n.n/m.m.m.m' is interpreted as a
  56. +`net/mask' pair. A host address is matched if `net' is equal to the
  57. +bitwise AND of the address and the `mask'. For example, the net/mask
  58. +pattern `131.155.72.0/255.255.254.0' matches every address in the
  59. +range `131.155.72.0' through `131.155.73.255'.
  60. +.IP \(bu
  61. +A string that begins with a `/' character is treated as a file
  62. +name. A host name or address is matched if it matches any host name
  63. +or address pattern listed in the named file. The file format is
  64. +zero or more lines with zero or more host name or address patterns
  65. +separated by whitespace. A file name pattern can be used anywhere
  66. +a host name or address pattern can be used.
  67. .SH WILDCARDS
  68. The access control language supports explicit wildcards:
  69. .IP ALL
  70. @@ -115,19 +122,19 @@ without -DPARANOID when you want more co
  71. .ne 6
  72. .SH OPERATORS
  73. .IP EXCEPT
  74. -Intended use is of the form: `list_1 EXCEPT list_2\'; this construct
  75. +Intended use is of the form: `list_1 EXCEPT list_2'; this construct
  76. matches anything that matches \fIlist_1\fR unless it matches
  77. \fIlist_2\fR. The EXCEPT operator can be used in daemon_lists and in
  78. client_lists. The EXCEPT operator can be nested: if the control
  79. -language would permit the use of parentheses, `a EXCEPT b EXCEPT c\'
  80. -would parse as `(a EXCEPT (b EXCEPT c))\'.
  81. +language would permit the use of parentheses, `a EXCEPT b EXCEPT c'
  82. +would parse as `(a EXCEPT (b EXCEPT c))'.
  83. .br
  84. .ne 6
  85. .SH SHELL COMMANDS
  86. If the first-matched access control rule contains a shell command, that
  87. command is subjected to %<letter> substitutions (see next section).
  88. The result is executed by a \fI/bin/sh\fR child process with standard
  89. -input, output and error connected to \fI/dev/null\fR. Specify an `&\'
  90. +input, output and error connected to \fI/dev/null\fR. Specify an `&'
  91. at the end of the command if you do not want to wait until it has
  92. completed.
  93. .PP
  94. @@ -159,7 +166,7 @@ depending on how much information is ava
  95. .IP %u
  96. The client user name (or "unknown").
  97. .IP %%
  98. -Expands to a single `%\' character.
  99. +Expands to a single `%' character.
  100. .PP
  101. Characters in % expansions that may confuse the shell are replaced by
  102. underscores.
  103. @@ -243,9 +250,9 @@ A positive IDENT lookup result (the clie
  104. less trustworthy. It is possible for an intruder to spoof both the
  105. client connection and the IDENT lookup, although doing so is much
  106. harder than spoofing just a client connection. It may also be that
  107. -the client\'s IDENT server is lying.
  108. +the client's IDENT server is lying.
  109. .PP
  110. -Note: IDENT lookups don\'t work with UDP services.
  111. +Note: IDENT lookups don't work with UDP services.
  112. .SH EXAMPLES
  113. The language is flexible enough that different types of access control
  114. policy can be expressed with a minimum of fuss. Although the language
  115. @@ -285,7 +292,7 @@ ALL: LOCAL @some_netgroup
  116. .br
  117. ALL: .foobar.edu EXCEPT terminalserver.foobar.edu
  118. .PP
  119. -The first rule permits access from hosts in the local domain (no `.\'
  120. +The first rule permits access from hosts in the local domain (no `.'
  121. in the host name) and from members of the \fIsome_netgroup\fP
  122. netgroup. The second rule permits access from all hosts in the
  123. \fIfoobar.edu\fP domain (notice the leading dot), with the exception of
  124. @@ -322,8 +329,8 @@ in.tftpd: LOCAL, .my.domain
  125. /etc/hosts.deny:
  126. .in +3
  127. .nf
  128. -in.tftpd: ALL: (/some/where/safe_finger -l @%h | \\
  129. - /usr/ucb/mail -s %d-%h root) &
  130. +in.tftpd: ALL: (/usr/sbin/safe_finger -l @%h | \\
  131. + /usr/bin/mail -s %d-%h root) &
  132. .fi
  133. .PP
  134. The safe_finger command comes with the tcpd wrapper and should be
  135. @@ -349,7 +356,7 @@ control rule; when the length of an acce
  136. capacity of an internal buffer; when an access control rule is not
  137. terminated by a newline character; when the result of %<letter>
  138. expansion would overflow an internal buffer; when a system call fails
  139. -that shouldn\'t. All problems are reported via the syslog daemon.
  140. +that shouldn't. All problems are reported via the syslog daemon.
  141. .SH FILES
  142. .na
  143. .nf