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- --- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/hosts_access.5 1995-01-30 19:51:47.000000000 +0100
- +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.5 2009-06-05 18:45:03.000000000 +0200
- @@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ name, host name/address) patterns. Exam
- impatient reader is encouraged to skip to the EXAMPLES section for a
- quick introduction.
- .PP
- -An extended version of the access control language is described in the
- -\fIhosts_options\fR(5) document. The extensions are turned on at
- -program build time by building with -DPROCESS_OPTIONS.
- +The extended version of the access control language is described in the
- +\fIhosts_options\fR(5) document. \fBNote that this language supersedes
- +the meaning of \fIshell_command\fB as documented below.\fR
- .PP
- In the following text, \fIdaemon\fR is the the process name of a
- network daemon process, and \fIclient\fR is the name and/or address of
- @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ A newline character is ignored when it i
- character. This permits you to break up long lines so that they are
- easier to edit.
- .IP \(bu
- -Blank lines or lines that begin with a `#\' character are ignored.
- +Blank lines or lines that begin with a `#' character are ignored.
- This permits you to insert comments and whitespace so that the tables
- are easier to read.
- .IP \(bu
- @@ -69,26 +69,33 @@ checks are case insensitive.
- .SH PATTERNS
- The access control language implements the following patterns:
- .IP \(bu
- -A string that begins with a `.\' character. A host name is matched if
- +A string that begins with a `.' character. A host name is matched if
- the last components of its name match the specified pattern. For
- -example, the pattern `.tue.nl\' matches the host name
- -`wzv.win.tue.nl\'.
- +example, the pattern `.tue.nl' matches the host name
- +`wzv.win.tue.nl'.
- .IP \(bu
- -A string that ends with a `.\' character. A host address is matched if
- +A string that ends with a `.' character. A host address is matched if
- its first numeric fields match the given string. For example, the
- -pattern `131.155.\' matches the address of (almost) every host on the
- +pattern `131.155.' matches the address of (almost) every host on the
- Eind\%hoven University network (131.155.x.x).
- .IP \(bu
- -A string that begins with an `@\' character is treated as an NIS
- +A string that begins with an `@' character is treated as an NIS
- (formerly YP) netgroup name. A host name is matched if it is a host
- member of the specified netgroup. Netgroup matches are not supported
- for daemon process names or for client user names.
- .IP \(bu
- -An expression of the form `n.n.n.n/m.m.m.m\' is interpreted as a
- -`net/mask\' pair. A host address is matched if `net\' is equal to the
- -bitwise AND of the address and the `mask\'. For example, the net/mask
- -pattern `131.155.72.0/255.255.254.0\' matches every address in the
- -range `131.155.72.0\' through `131.155.73.255\'.
- +An expression of the form `n.n.n.n/m.m.m.m' is interpreted as a
- +`net/mask' pair. A host address is matched if `net' is equal to the
- +bitwise AND of the address and the `mask'. For example, the net/mask
- +pattern `131.155.72.0/255.255.254.0' matches every address in the
- +range `131.155.72.0' through `131.155.73.255'.
- +.IP \(bu
- +A string that begins with a `/' character is treated as a file
- +name. A host name or address is matched if it matches any host name
- +or address pattern listed in the named file. The file format is
- +zero or more lines with zero or more host name or address patterns
- +separated by whitespace. A file name pattern can be used anywhere
- +a host name or address pattern can be used.
- .SH WILDCARDS
- The access control language supports explicit wildcards:
- .IP ALL
- @@ -115,19 +122,19 @@ without -DPARANOID when you want more co
- .ne 6
- .SH OPERATORS
- .IP EXCEPT
- -Intended use is of the form: `list_1 EXCEPT list_2\'; this construct
- +Intended use is of the form: `list_1 EXCEPT list_2'; this construct
- matches anything that matches \fIlist_1\fR unless it matches
- \fIlist_2\fR. The EXCEPT operator can be used in daemon_lists and in
- client_lists. The EXCEPT operator can be nested: if the control
- -language would permit the use of parentheses, `a EXCEPT b EXCEPT c\'
- -would parse as `(a EXCEPT (b EXCEPT c))\'.
- +language would permit the use of parentheses, `a EXCEPT b EXCEPT c'
- +would parse as `(a EXCEPT (b EXCEPT c))'.
- .br
- .ne 6
- .SH SHELL COMMANDS
- If the first-matched access control rule contains a shell command, that
- command is subjected to %<letter> substitutions (see next section).
- The result is executed by a \fI/bin/sh\fR child process with standard
- -input, output and error connected to \fI/dev/null\fR. Specify an `&\'
- +input, output and error connected to \fI/dev/null\fR. Specify an `&'
- at the end of the command if you do not want to wait until it has
- completed.
- .PP
- @@ -159,7 +166,7 @@ depending on how much information is ava
- .IP %u
- The client user name (or "unknown").
- .IP %%
- -Expands to a single `%\' character.
- +Expands to a single `%' character.
- .PP
- Characters in % expansions that may confuse the shell are replaced by
- underscores.
- @@ -243,9 +250,9 @@ A positive IDENT lookup result (the clie
- less trustworthy. It is possible for an intruder to spoof both the
- client connection and the IDENT lookup, although doing so is much
- harder than spoofing just a client connection. It may also be that
- -the client\'s IDENT server is lying.
- +the client's IDENT server is lying.
- .PP
- -Note: IDENT lookups don\'t work with UDP services.
- +Note: IDENT lookups don't work with UDP services.
- .SH EXAMPLES
- The language is flexible enough that different types of access control
- policy can be expressed with a minimum of fuss. Although the language
- @@ -285,7 +292,7 @@ ALL: LOCAL @some_netgroup
- .br
- ALL: .foobar.edu EXCEPT terminalserver.foobar.edu
- .PP
- -The first rule permits access from hosts in the local domain (no `.\'
- +The first rule permits access from hosts in the local domain (no `.'
- in the host name) and from members of the \fIsome_netgroup\fP
- netgroup. The second rule permits access from all hosts in the
- \fIfoobar.edu\fP domain (notice the leading dot), with the exception of
- @@ -322,8 +329,8 @@ in.tftpd: LOCAL, .my.domain
- /etc/hosts.deny:
- .in +3
- .nf
- -in.tftpd: ALL: (/some/where/safe_finger -l @%h | \\
- - /usr/ucb/mail -s %d-%h root) &
- +in.tftpd: ALL: (/usr/sbin/safe_finger -l @%h | \\
- + /usr/bin/mail -s %d-%h root) &
- .fi
- .PP
- The safe_finger command comes with the tcpd wrapper and should be
- @@ -349,7 +356,7 @@ control rule; when the length of an acce
- capacity of an internal buffer; when an access control rule is not
- terminated by a newline character; when the result of %<letter>
- expansion would overflow an internal buffer; when a system call fails
- -that shouldn\'t. All problems are reported via the syslog daemon.
- +that shouldn't. All problems are reported via the syslog daemon.
- .SH FILES
- .na
- .nf
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